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Prof Alexander Brooks
ALEXANDER BROOKS: 5 We are going to shift the focus a little bit.
We are continuing our discussion of Megan's Law, but Professor Janus
and I, taking opposite positions, are going to discuss a feature of
Megan's Law, which is also a statute in Minnesota," 6 from where he
hails. The statute we are going to discuss provides for the involuntary
civil commitment of violent sexual predators.
The New Jersey statute on involuntary civil commitment of
sexually violent predators is modeled, but only in a modest way, on a
statute which was enacted in Washington several years ago."' The
Washington statute,518 which was relatively novel," 9 if there is such a
way to characterize anything, provides for the civil commitment of
515 Justice Joseph Weintraub Professor of Law Emeritus, Rutgers School of Law,
Newark, New Jersey. Professor Brooks wishes to express his appreciation to the staff of the
New York Law School Journal of Human Rights for footnoting his presentation.
516 See MINN. STAT. ANN. §243.166 (West 1994) (requiring registration of
predatory offenders).
517 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9A.44.130 (West Supp. 1996).
518 Id.
511 See Beth Keiko Fujimoto, Sexual Violence, Sanity, and Safety: Constitutional
Parametersfor Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sex Offender, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
879, 884 (1992).
The Washington Sexually Violent Predators Act
involuntary commitment system is unique in at
least two respects. First, commitment proceedings
may be initiated only against' persons currently
confined for certain 'sexually violent offenses' who
are about to be released .... Second, the Act does
not require that a new criminal charge be brought to
initiate commitment proceedings. Id.
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sexually violent predators after they have completed their prison
sentences. 2 This is a relatively new development in American law.'
The statute provides for the commitment of persons who are
ruled by a court or a jury to be likely to engage in future predatory acts
of sexual violence and who suffer from either a mental abnormality or
a personality disorder 22 There are two components in the statute which,
to a great extent, represent a classic involuntary civil commitment
situation, namely, dangerousness and mental pathology. 3
The legislature of the State of Washington anticipated, (and said)
that the statute would apply only to a very small, but extremely
dangerous, group of sex offenders. In the years that have followed, that
expectation has been realized. 24 In that very large state, and out of
thousands of sex offenders who have been convicted of sexual crimes,
only thirty-six predators have been committed to date. 25
520 See WASH. REV. CODE §71.09.030 (1990); see also WASH REV. CODE
§9A.44.130 (1995).
521 See Stephen ]. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention,
76 B.U.L. REV. 113, 114 (1996).
522 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.09.020 (West 1995); see also Gary Gelb,
Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: The Need to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric
Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
213, 231 (1991) (discussingthat the trier of fact can be confused in determining if a person
suffers from a disorder due to misleading psychiatric terminology).
523 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.09.020(1)(West Supp. 1996) (defining a sexually
violent predator as "anyone who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual
violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the
person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence").
524 See John Q. La Fond, Washington'sSexually Violent Predator Statute: Law or
Lottery? A Response to Professor Brooks, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 755, 770 (1992)
(quoting Professor Brooks that "the statute results in the confinement of a very small cohort
of offenders").
525 Report, Roxanne Lieb, Washington State Sexually Violent Predators: Profile
of Special Commitment Center Residents, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUBLIC POL'Y (Oct. 1996)
(reporting that the number of sexual predators confined under the Washington statute has
since increased to thirty-six).
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The Washington State Attorney General indicated that
determinations of civil commitment should not be made unless the
offender also had a record of sexual violence.5 26 The Supreme Court of
Washington, in upholding the constitutionalityof the statute, also spoke
about the need for a proven record. 27 So, although the statute itself
simply speaks about the need of one conviction at minimum,52 in fact
the statute is applied only against sex offenders who, in addition to the
other requirements referred to, also have a record of violent sexual
offenses.529
I should mention that the usual procedural requirements that are
typical of criminal prosecutions apply, such as the burden of proof
resting on the state. 3 That burden requires that findings must be
beyond a reasonable doubt. A very important point is that violent sexual
predators are housed and treated in a separate building. 3' They are not
commingled with other psychiatric patients.532 The New Jersey statute
526 See generally In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 993 (Wash. 1993) (holding that the
state has the burden of proving, "beyond a reasonable doubt, that the detainee is, in fact, a
sexually violent predator").
527 Id. at 1003 (stating "the statute inherently applies only to dangerous offenders.
• .those likely to engage in predatory acts of violence").
52 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.09.030 (West 1995) (requiring a person need
only have been convicted of"a sexually violent offense" and is about to be released).
529 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1 )(West 1995) (defining a sexually violent
predator as anyone convicted of or charged with a sexually violent crime and suffers from
a mental abnormality or personality disorder making it probable that the person will, if not
committed to a safe facility, re-offend).
530 See Young, 857 P.2d at 1007.
53' WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.09.060(1) (West 1995) (stating that those found
to be sexually violent predators are housed in a secure facility that is operated by the
Department of Social and Health Services).
532 See Young, 857 P.2d at 1005 (stating that "sexually violent predators, those
adjudged likely to engage in acts of violence, are housed in a special commitment center
which must be located within a correction facility").
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does not provide for any such segregation of the offenders who are
committed there. 33
One might ask at the outset why such a statute has come into
being. The history is that of the Shriner case in Washington. 34 The
facts of the Shriner case seem to be replicated in many states."' They
have been replicated several times recently in the State of New Jersey 36
Shriner was a sex offender with a twenty-five-yearrecord of sex
crimes and convictions. 37 He murdered a young girl when he was
sixteen, but instead of being convicted, 3 he was sent to a juvenile
institution . 39 Later, when he seriously molested two young girls, he
finally committed a crime for which the judge sentenced him to twenty
years, ten years on each of the two counts. 4° The judge, in sentencing,
533 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:4-8(c) (West 1996) ("No person committed under this
section shall be confined within any penal or correctional institution or any part thereof').
"" Popkin, supra note 117, at 66 (discussingthe case of a seven-year-old boy who
was forced into the woods near Takoma, Washington, raped, stabbed and mutilated by his
attacker, whom he later identified as Earl Shriner, a released sex offender).
... See Ball, supra note 206, at 401-03 (1996) (discussing the disappearance,
molestation and murder of ChristopherMeyer by a convicted child killer in Illinois); Kelly
A. McCaffrey, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators in Kansas: A Modern
Law for Modern Times, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 887 (1994) (discussing the rape and murder of
Stephanie Schmidt by a recently released inmate with a history of violent sexual offenses);
Peter A. Zamoyski, Will Californiak "One Strike" Law Stop Sexual Predators, or is a Civil
CommitmentSystem Needed?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1250, at 1250-51 (1995) (discussing
the disappearance and murder of Polly Klaas by Richard Allen Davis, a parolee with prior
sex-related convictions).
536 See, e.g., New Jersey v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164 (1996) (upholding
defendant's conviction on kidnapping, rape and murder of eight-year-old child).
I" See Kate Shatzkin, Lack of Remorse Key in Sentence for Shriner-Exceptional
131-Year Term Given for Mutilation of Tacoma Boy, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 27, 1990, at Cl.
538 Id.
539 See Jim Simon, System SimplyHadNo Way to 'Digest'Shriner, SEATrLETIMEs,
June 1, 1989, at El.
54 See In re Shriner, 627 P.2d 99 (Wash. 198 1) (en banc). Shriner was sentenced
to ten years for second-degree assault and ten years for second-degree kidnapping. Id.
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however, made a minor technical error in the sentencing process. 4'
There was an appeal to the Washington State Supreme Court,542 and
although I very much doubt the Court would ever do this again, the
Court decided not to send the case back to the judge for proper
sentencing of Shriner and they just cut the sentence in half.43 As a
result, Shriner, who should have served-twenty years in prison, ended up
serving only ten. 44
Just before Shriner was due to be discharged from prison,
officials there learned that he had maintained a diary in which he had
indicated that on discharge from prison he intended to buy himself
equipment with which to kidnap and torture children. 45 He had
drawings of a vanwith cages in it where he was going to imprison the
children he kidnapped. 46 Those who were familiar with Shriner, and
who knew of his history, were quite convinced that he would do
whatever he could to accomplish those objectives. 47 Therefore, they
i4' Id. The trial court did not indicate in the proper way at the time of sentencing
"whether the sentences were to be served concurrently or consecutively," although it was
clearly his intention that the sentences be consecutive. Id. Subsequently,the Supreme Court
of Washington held that because the lower court had not designated consecutive sentences
in the appropriate way, the sentences would run concurrently. Id.
542 Id. at 100. Shriner petitioned the Court to order the Board of Prison Terms and
Paroles "to reset his prison terms so that they run concurrently." Id.
... Id: at 101.
544 Id.
141 See Jerry Seper, System Fails to Stop Repeat Offenders; WASH. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1993, available in 1993 WL 6456820. "A cellmate of Shriner's told Department of
Corrections Officials in a March 1987 taped interview that [Shriner] 'was talking about
buying a van and having the back end customimd where he could have chains and shackles
on the walls plus a cage or two in there so he can take a kid into the van and drive off into
the woods!" Id. at A7.
546 Id.
54' Kate Shatzkin, 600 Hundred Years in Prison Sought for Shriner, SEATTLE
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1990, at Al (referringto the states' sentencing recommendation"prosecutors
will cite 12 aggravating factors to support their recommendation, including the deliberate
cruelty to the child, the psychological trauma inflicted on him, Shriner's sophisticated
planning for the attack, and his 24-year history of attacks on children").
[Vol.. -III
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tried to have him civilly committed to keep him off the street as soon as
he was discharged from prison.548 They brought civil commitment
proceedings under the then existing civil commitment statute, which
had been designed for persons entirely different from Shriner.549 The
civil commitment statutes were enacted for the purpose of short-term
commitment for psychotic persons who could be treated quickly with
anti-psychotic drugs and then discharged from the hospital.55 The
statute also required that in order to fulfill the criterion of
dangerousness, it had to be shown that the person to be committed had
engaged in a recent overt act of dangerousness. 5 ' The overt act
provision was designed to insure that a psychiatric opinion that the
person is dangerous would be, in effect, corroborated by a recent overt
act consistent with that opinion.552 The judge did not consider the
keeping of the diary, the making of the plans or the discussion of torture
548 Raquel Blacher, Comment, Historical Perspective of the "Sex Psychopath"
Statute: From the RevolutionaryEra to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV.
889, 909 (1995). State officials were unable to commit Shriner under the involuntary
commitment act because he did not "meet the two criteria necessary: Shriner was not
mentally ill and he had not performed any overt act during his confinement for the assault
on the two girls demonstrating dangerousness to himself or others." Id
9 Nathaniel L. Taylor, Abuse of Judicial Review: The Unwarranted Demise of
the Sexually Violent Predators Statute by Young v. Weston, 71 WASH. L. REv. 543, 545-46
(1996) (stating that the task force appointed to evaluate the civil commitment statute found
that it only applied "to those with serious mental illness"). See also Blacher, supra note 228,
at 910.
550 See Taylor, supra note 549.
551 See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§7 1.05.020(3),.150(2), .215(1), (8), .230 (West
1996) ("[A] showing of a of substantial risk of physical harm as evidenced by a recent overt
act, which act may be one which has caused harm or creates a reasonable apprehension of
dangerousness, is necessary before an individual can be involuntarilycommitted for a mental
disorder.").
552 See id. at §71.05.020(3). The requirement for an overt act is based on a court
decision interpretingthe statute, not on the statute itself. See In re Harris, 654 P.2d 109, 113
(Wash. 1982) (rulingthat a recent overt act was necessaryto fulfill the statutory requirement
of substantial dangerousness).
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overt acts, and thus, he dismissed the case, and Shriner could not be
committed. " 3
I should mention in passing that since that episode, the
Washington State legislature has enacted a different provision of the
statute, which reads that the term "overt act" also includes a reasonable
apprehension of harm.554 That provision was designed to cover precisely
what had occurred in the Shriner case. 5"
Shrinerwas discharged 56 Within several months, he committed
several sex offenses, including kidnapping a little girl.5 7 On each
occasion, he successfully plea bargained to very minor offenses whose
punishmentwas lenient" Finally, he kidnapped a little boy, sodomized
him, mutilated him, and cut his penis off.59 When the little boy was
discovered, it was quickly ascertained that it was Shriner who had
committed theoffense 6 ° The same thing that happened in New Jersey
with Megan's Law happened in the State of Washington.16' There was
an enormous uproar, a public outcry 62 Parents and others formed what
... See generally Blacher, supra note 548, at 909.
554 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.020(3)(West Supp. 1996) ("[Rjecent overt act
means any act that has either caused harm of a sexually violent nature or creates a reasonable
apprehension of such harm").
... See Juliet M. Dupuy, The Evolution of Wisconsin's Sexual Predator Law, 79
MARQ. L. REv. 873 (1996) ("[S]hriner's crime incited the Washington Legislature, and on
July 1, 1990, it enacted section 71.09 of the Washington Code .... ).
556 See generally David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the
Word, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 525 (1992).
557 Id.
558 Id. at 545.
9 Id. at 525.
560 Id.
561 See Constantine Angeles, Samples Collectedfor Sex-Assault Trial; "Brigade"
Rallies, SEATTLE TIMEs, June 21, 1989, at B4 (stating that "the victim['s] ... mother and
others, have kicked off a campaign for a special legislative session to get tough with violent
offenders").
562 Sally MacDonald, A Thank You Note from Tacoma, "Your Daily Thoughts and
Prayers Have CertainlyPerformedPart of the Miracle, "Says Boy's Mother, SEATTLETIMES,
July 8, 1989, at Al.
[Vol. XIII
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they called a tennis shoe brigade. 63 This tennis shoe brigade sent the
governor hundreds of thousands of tennis shoes.564
The legislature of the State of Washington acted with dispatch.
But, the Washington legislature did not act the way New Jersey acted,
but with great deliberation 65 They did not declare a state of emergency.
No one was running for the United States Senate, and so the legislature
took months, holding hearings, with law professors on the panel who
helped them decide what kind of legislation would be appropriate under
the circumstances. 66 They also enacted a whole package of laws, as
New Jersey did. However, I would say that these laws were much more
carefully considered than the laws enacted in New Jersey, and the
legislature decided that they would have to have a statute that would
provide for civil commitment of very dangerous sexual predators. 67
Why would it be necessary to have such a statute?
There are several reasons: first, there was a widespread
perception that many sex offenders were given extremely lenient
sentences for very serious offenses,56 as a result of which they came out
of prison only to re-offend after relatively short periods of time. 69 For
563 Id. Helen Harlow, the mother of the victim, formed the organization called
SAVUS (Stop All Violent Unnecessary Suffering) and chose the tennis shoe as the symbol
of children. Id. Calling itself the "Tennis Shoe Brigade," SAVUS urged the public to send
in thousandsof tennis shoes to the governor to urge him to call a special legislative session
to deal with this issue. Id.
51 Mark Matassa, Message for Governor on Crime: Thousands of Tennis Shoes
Dumped at Capitol in Call for Special Session, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 8, 1989, at C2.
5 See Linda Shaw, Campaign Paying Offfor Victims of Crimes, SEATTLE TiMEs,
Nov. 19, 1990, at Al (stating that the passage of the state's sexual-predator legislation is a
step toward re-balancing a criminal justice system).
566Id.
567 Petrucelli, supra note 2, at 1127.
568 Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality of Civilly Committing Violent
Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 709, 712 (1992) ("[P]revious sentencing
legislation and practices were now perceived as having been far too lenient .... ").
569 Lewis, supra note 213, at 93. But see Robert C. Boruchowitz, Sexual Predator
Law-The Nightmare in the Halls of Justice, 15 U. PUGET SouND L. REv. 872, 836 (1992)
("[N]either psychologists nor psychiatrists can predict whether a particular person will re-
96 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIII
example, the legislature was concerned with plea bargaining. 7 If one
studies the way many states deal with sex offenders, one will find that
the prosecutors' offices engage in enormous amounts of plea
bargaining 7' Some of this plea bargaining is, undoubtedly, justified. 72
Much of it is simply a product of prosecutorial eagerness to resolve a
case without having to go to trial. 73 Maybe some of the prosecutors are
overburdened, and the more cases they can settle by plea bargaining, the
better for them. 74
But the fact is that there are two consequences to this plea
bargaining in sex offense cases.575 One, of course, is that sentences are
reduced, often down to ludicrously minimal terms,576 except for very
serious crimes. 77  Another consequence, which has been generally
overlooked, is that offenders bargain out of the sex offender category.7
They bargain down to a charge without any sexual overtones to it, such
as assault or kidnapping. 79 The fact is that many sex offenders
offend.").
570 La Fond, supra note 524, at 768.
5" Nathaniel J. Pallone, Cut Plea Bargains and Extend Probation, STAR LEDGER
(Newark), July 21, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7950611.
572 Abbe Smith, Prosecuting Sex Crimes in the 90's: A Defense Perspective, 17
HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 227, 233 (1994) (book review).
573 Id. at 235.
574 Id.
575 Ted Gest, et. al., The Real Problem in American Justice, A System in Crisis from
Cops to Courts to Prisons, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 1995, at 2.
576 Brooks, supra note 568, at 712.
577 Id.
578 Michelle Pia Jerusalem, A Framework for Post-Sentence Sex Offender
Legislation: Perspectives on Prevention, Registration, and the Public's "Right" to Know,
48 VAND. L. REv. 219, 221 n.8 (1995) (citing an example of a sex offender who was not
required to register because "he avoided sex offense charges through plea bargains").
571 See Jeffrey A. Klotz et. al., Cognitive Restructuring Through Law: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to Sex Offenders and the Plea Process, 15 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 579, 586-88 (1992) (discussing "charge" bargaining, under which the sex
offender pleads guilty to a lesser charge and thus has a less serious, criminal record and is
subject.to limited penalties).
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successfully plea bargain, and then are not recorded as sex. offenders."'
Their rap sheets do not indicate that they are sex offenders, even though
that is what they are5 8'
Let us take the case of Jesse Timmendequas, the man who killed
Megan Kanka 82 Before killing Megan Kanka, he had committed a
crime for which he could have received a sentence of thirty years. 3
Since he was, at that time, a re-offender, it would have been appropriate
for the judge to sentence him for up to thirty years. 84 However, he was
sentenced to seven and one-half years, 85 of which he served six.5 86 Yet,
the statute used, with the severe penalty, was designed especially for
people like him. 7 The fact is that the Timmendequas story can be
replicated over and over again, representingthe leniency with which the
judiciary often treats sex crimes. 88 In New York, we had the case of a
580 Id. at 587.
58 Id. at 593-94.
582 Cf Lisa Colangelo, Megan's Law Put to Test, ASBURYPARK PRESS (New
Jersey), Oct. 22, 1996, at A I (noting that Jesse Timmendequas is accused of Megan Kanka's
death and is still awaiting trial).
583 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§2C:14-2, 14-6, 43-6-7 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996)
(establishing sentencing guidelines).
584 Id.
585 Mike Kelly, The Soul of Megan, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Jan. 15, 1995, at
A29 (stating Timmendequaswas sentenced to ten years at Avenel, of which he served six);
Eugene Kiely, State Weighs RegisteringSex Offenders, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Aug. 3,
1994, at A3.
586 Id.
587 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-1(1)(a) (West 1996).
The danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders
and offenders who commit other predatory acts
against children, and the dangers posed by person
who preys on others as a result of mental illness,
require a system ofregistrationthat will permit law
enforcement officialsto identify and alert the public
when necessary for the public safety. Id.
588 Campbell, supra note 389, at 533 (quoting New Jersey State Senate President
DiFrancesco as saying that Megan's Law was "designed to close the deficiencies and the
leniency in our laws that allow dangerous, even deadly, sexual offenders to threaten our
98 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIII
judge who was recently found to be exceedingly lenient with men who
beat up their wives and girlfriends.589 But the public, the governor, and
the mayor are expressing a reaction to this leniency.59°
But there are other problems that I do not want to dwell on at too
great length concerning the way the criminal justice system deals with
sex offenders, but I think Linda Fairstein would perhaps agree with me
that over the years there have been many limitations in the criminal
justice system that make adequate prosecution and conviction of sex
offenders extremely difficult.59' In fact, the legislature assumed,
whether correctly or not, that the sexual violent predator statute was kind
of a stopgap measure and a failsafe measure to make sure that extremely
dangerous predators who have slipped through the cracks of the criminal
justice system would be kept off the streets.
592
neighborhoods and harm our children").
589 Joyce Purnick, Judge Wasn't Alone in Failing Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29,
1996, at B7. (discussing Brooklyn Criminal Court Judge Lorin Duckman who freed accused
batterer, Oliver Benito, on bail). Shortly after his release, Benito killed the woman he was
accused of beating and then killed himself. Id. See also Matthew Purdy & Don Van Natta
Jr., Before the Murder, a Judicial Journey; An Abusive Union, a Testy Judge and a Chaotic
System. that Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1996, at BI (stating that prosecutors were
compiling records of their perceived bias by Duckman against young assistant district
attorneys); Dan Morrison, Feet to Fire, NEWSDAY, Feb. 24, 1996, at A3 (referring to prior
case where Duckman had released a convicted batterer who was later re-arrested for abusing
the same individual).
59 See Purnick, supra note 589 (stating that New York Governor George Pataki
urged Duckman's removal); Morrison, supra note 589 (describing reaction to the Benito case
by New York Mayor Rudolph Guiliani, comparing the city judges to the police "Blue Wall
of Silence," and the National Organization of Women, "saying Duckman had displayed a
'high level of misogyny' in his comments and rulings..."); see also Clifford Levy, Pataki
Proposes Law to Let Prosecutors Appeal Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1996, at Al.
"' See generally FAIRSTEIN, supra note 245, at 272 (discussing developments in
the legal system that aid in the prosecution and conviction of sex offenders and the
limitations of the current judicial system such as the lack of proper medical care for
survivors, inadequate response by enforcement agencies and poor counseling services).
592 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §168 Legislative Findings and Intent (McKinney 1995).
The legislature finds that the danger of recidivism
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What are the criticisms of the statute? I would like to limit
myself to the three most important criticisms. Before I get into them
specifically, I should mention there are many critics who would object
to the statute by saying it is preventive detention, as though the words
"preventive detention" are talismanic words indicating no good. 93 I
have talked in the past to some fairly eminent people who said that it
was impossible in our state of government to have preventive
detention.5 94 But we do use preventive detention all the time.595 One of
the most common forms of preventive detention is civil commitment,
where we take mentally ill and dangerous people and put them in a
hospital to detain them and prevent them from engaging in dangerous
posed by sex offenders, especially those sexually
violent offenders who commit predatory acts
characterized by repetitive and compulsive
behavior, and that the protection of the public from
these offenders is of paramount concern of interest
to government. The legislature further finds that
law enforcement agencies' efforts to protect their
communities, conduct investigations and quickly
apprehend sex offenders are impaired by the lack of
information about sex offenders who live within
their jurisdiction and that the lack of information
shared with the public may result in the failure of
the criminal justice system to identify, investigate,
apprehend and prosecute sex offenders. Id.
593 Morse, supra note 521, at 128 (stating that although most disorders can be
"treated more effectively and inexpensively in the community," the "prevention of serious
violence" justifies the costs associated with preventive detention).
594 Compare Brooks, supra note 568, at 753-54, with La Fond, supra note 524, at
778 (challenging Professor Brooks' contention that the Washington Law is a "lawful
exercise" of preventive detention, concludingthat the law "cannot be sustained under either
Salerno or Foucha as a lawful exercise of the state's power of preventive detention").
"I Daniel J. Smith, Comment, The Constitutionality of Preventive Detention in
Texas, 40 BAYLOR L. REv. 467, 467 (1988) (discussing how judges practice preventive
detention by imposing bails they know are too high for the defendants to reach, and by
increasingly denying bail to dangerous defendants).
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behavior? 6 In fact, here in the State of New York, persons who are put
in prison and who either are already mentally ill or become mentally ill
while they are in prison and are perceived to be dangerous, can be
involuntarily civilly committed as soon as their term in prison is over.597
Backstrom v. Herol 9 requires only that the procedures be the same as
in any other civil commitment."' As long as sex offenders are treated
procedurally the same way as any other person, such a preventive
detention civil commitment statute is constitutionally proper.6 °0
The first criticism of the statute deals with one of the two
elements of a civil commitment. 6° ' The United States Supreme Court
requires two elements for a constitutionallyproper civil commitment.6 2
The first element for civil commitment is dangerousness or some
9 Unlike criminal prosecution and incarceration, which are based on deterrence
and retribution, civil commitment, although usually indefinite in duration, must end when
the individual is either no longer dangerous to society or is no longer mentally ill. See, e.g.,
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77-78 (1992).
597 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §730.50 (McKinney 1996).
598 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
199 Id. at 114-15.
6 Equal protection mandates that any distinctionmade between groups of people
must have some rational relation to the purpose for which the distinction is made. Id. at 111.
601 Brooks, supra note 568, at 713-14. Brooks reviews four challenges to
Washington State's Sexually Violent Predator Statute:
that the statute provides for unacceptable
preventive detention .... [T]hat the terminology
used to identify the mental condition of sexually
violent predators is vague and meaningless ....
[T]hat the treatment program necessarily relies on
a false assumption that efficacious treatment is
available and argues that without efficacious
treatment the statute must fail .... [Further, that]
the confinement involved . . . is based on
predictionsof future dangerousness that are highly
inaccurate .... Further, it states that preventive
detention is a "threshold charge against the statute."
Id.
602 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
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comparable incapacity, such as being gravely disabled." 3 Many courts
require only dangerousness.6"4 That is not, in my view, correct;
however, that is widely thought to be the case. The second element
required is some form of mental incapacity or pathology, which is
usually, but not always, referred to as mental illness or mental
disorder.6"5 The term "mental disorder" is used in the bible of the
American Psychiatric Association, the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual, DSM- V.606 DSM-IV does not use the term "mental illness."'6°7
That term has been superseded by the term "mental disorder.""6 8 But
what the Supreme Court seems to require are those two factors.60 9
The legislature of the State of Washington used the term "mental
abnormality," not "mental disorder" or "mental illness," and they defined
it in the following way: as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting
the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to the
commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting a menace to
the health and safety of others." 1° That definition has been attacked by
the United States District Court in Seattle, which, despite the fact that
the Washington State Supreme Court validated the constitutionality of
603 See CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGYAND LAW: RESEARCH
AND APPLICATION 155 (2d ed. 1994).
4 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) ("[A] State cannot
constitutionally confine, without more, a non-dangerous individual .... ).
.0' Foucha, 504 U.S. 71. "The state may ... confine a mentally ill person if it
shows by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill .... Id. at 82.
The Court rejected Louisiana'sassertion that diagnosis of an "anti-social personality" could
satisfy the mental illness requirement imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. The Court found that the use of anti-social personality disorder would
"permit the state to hold indefinitely any other insanity acquittee not mentally ill ..... Id.
606 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRICASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTICAND STATISTICAL MANUAL




9 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
610 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §71.09.020(2) (West 1996).
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this statute, declared the statute unconstitutional 61" That decision of the
District Court has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals 612 In the meantime, the U.S. Supreme Court has accepted the
case of State v. Hendricks, which involves a statute almost identical to
that of Washington. (Argument was heard on December 10, 1996). The
Washington State Supreme Court accepted mental abnormality and said
that the mere fact that the term was not in DSM-III-R,1 3 or DSM IV,614
as it was at the time, is not the important issue.6"5 What they said was
that, in fact, the legislature had intended, by using the term "mental
abnormality," to encompass all mental disorders that are in the DSM,
plus any other comparable mental disorders that may not yet be in
DSM.616
611 Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (holding the law
violated the Due Process, Ex Post Facto, and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitution).
612 See Richard Seven & Deborah Nelson, Sex Predator Law Ruled
Unconstitutional; Attorneys Begin Applyingfor Immediate Release of31, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 26, 1995, at Al.
6 1 3 AMRICANPSYCHIATRICASSOCIATION DIAGNOSTICANDSTATISTICALMANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS - II-R (3rd ed. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
6"4 DSM-IV, supra note 606.
615 "The fact that pathologically driven rape, for example, is not yet listed in the
DSM-III-R does not invalidate such a diagnosis. The DSM is, after all, an evolving and
imperfect document. Nor is it sacrosanct." In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1001.
616 "In using the concept of'mental abnormality'the legislature has invoked a more
generalized terminology that can cover a much larger variety of disorders. Some, such as
the paraphilias, are covered in the DSM-III-R; others are not." In re Young, 857 P.2d at
1001 (quoting Brooks, supra note 568, at 733).
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The mental disorders involved here are mainly paraphilias 7
The one paraphilia that is the most predominant among sex offenders is
pedophil ia.61 s The proportion of sex offenders who molest children is
very high. 19
Very briefly, I will discuss personality disorders. Many sex
offenders are diagnosed with an anti-social personality disorder,
commonly called psychopaths or sociopaths.2 ° In practice, although the
statute says either mental abnormality or personality disorder, no
psychologist who is certified in Washington will testify that a sexual
617 "The essential features of a paraphilic mental illness are 'recurrent intense sexual
urges and sexually arousing fantasies generally involving either: (1) non-human objects,
(2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's partner (not merely simulated), or (3)
children or other nonconsenting persons."' Young, 857 P.2d at 1002 (quoting DSM-1II-R,
supra note 613, at 279). "'[P]araphalianot otherwise specified'... is a residual category in
the DSM-1I1-R which encompasses both less commonly encountered paraphilias and those
not yet sufficiently described to merit formal inclusion in the DSM-III-R." Id. But see Bruce
J. Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness, I PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 534, 559 (1995) [hereinafterAmbiguities] ("[A]lthough the evidence is still
far from complete, it is increasingly thought that the major mental illnesses (until recently
known as psychoses)-likeschizophrenia, major depression, and bipolar disorder-meet the
traditional medical model of illness.").
618 But see John E.B. Myers et. al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse
Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REv. 1, 30 (1989) (describing the findings of a study conducted on
561 paraphiliacsto measure the frequency of different paraphilic acts, which found that the
paraphilic "acts occurring at the highest frequencies were: masochism (mean number of acts
per subject 1, 139.2) .... Pedophilia(child molestation)occurred from the rate of 23.2 mean
number of acts for men involved with female children unrelated to them to 281.7 mean
number of acts per offender for men who were involved with male children unrelated to
them").
699 But see Laura Davis et. al., Controlling Computer Access to Pornography:
Special Conditionsfor Sex Offenders; 59 FED. PROBATION 43 (1995) (stating that pedophiles
represent thirty percent of sex offenders).
620 Brooks, supra note 568, at 727 (acknowledging that some sexually violent
predators do suffer from mental pathology, but many do not). The labels "psychopath" and
"sexual psychopath" have been frequently denounced as meaningless. Id. at 727.
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offender fits under the statute if he meets only one of the two criteria.62" '
In other words, the way the statute is applied is to combine the two and
require both the presence of mental abnormality and .a personality
disorder.622 Experts rely heavily on the criteria that are used in the
DSM.623 If the offender also happens to suffer from a personality
disorder, then the experts throw that in as well.624 They would never
testify, however, that a person should be committed who does not suffer
from any paraphilia or other mental disorder in the DSM and who
suffers only from a personality disorder.625
The district judge who declared the statute unconstitutional
rested his decision heavily on the fact that, for all practical purposes,
mental "abnormality" is not a mental illness or mental disorder in the
DSM.626 He therefore concluded that mental abnormality could not
qualify for the Supreme Court requirement of the requisite mental
element.627 But, the federal judge actually distorted the legislative
621 See, e.g., In re Twining, 894 P.2d 1331 (Wash. 1995) (upholding commitment
of sex offender on the basis of a doctor's expert testimony that Twining satisfied the
definition of both mental abnormality and personality disorder as defined in the statute).
622 In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1018. "It would thwart the legislative purpose if the
statute only allowed the commitment of those who suffer from one or the other .... Thus,
the showing that Young suffers both a mental abnormality and a personality disorder meets
the requirements of the statute." Id.
623 Winick, supra note 617, at 557.
624 See Young, 857 P.2d at 1002; In re Twining, 894 P.2d at 1338.
625 "The essential component missing from the Sexually Violent Predator Statute
is the requirement that the detainee be mentally ill." Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744,
749 (W.D. Wash. 1995). "The Court concludes that the Sexually Violent Predator Statute,
allowing as it does the indefinite confinement of persons who are not mentally ill, violates
the substantive protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 751.
626 Id. at 750.
627 "Indeed, in testimony before the legislature, one member of the Task Force
explained that Washington's traditional civil commitment law, WASH. REV. CODE §71.05,
et. seq., was inappropriate for Earl Shriner, the perpetrator of the highly publicized assault
and mutilationof a young boy, because he [Shriner] was not mentally ill." SENATE LAW &
JUSTICE Comm., Testimony of Professor Boerner, at 1 (Jan. 10, 1990). In describing Earl
Shriner, Professor Boerner stated "Mr. Shriner is not mentally ill, as that term is defined. He
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record.62 What he said was that the legislature acknowledged that
people like Shriner should be committed but that they were not mentally
ill.629 Obviously, if they admit he is not mentally ill, that destroys the
mental element.63 But that is not what the legislature said. What the
legislature actually said was that people like Shriner are not mentally ill
for the purpose of the then existing civil commitment statute, which is
an entirely different form of statement' 3 What the legislature said was
that the definitions that were being used for the other purpose would not
fit Shriner, and so they were creating a new definition of mental illness,
mental disorder, and mental abnormality, which they felt would describe
people like Shriner.632
There is a big issue here about the mental element requirement.
The personality disorder issue is one in which there ought not to be any
.primary or exclusive reliance, and there is none.633 The definition
is clearly a problem, and clearly very dangerous, but he doesn't suffer from a classic mental
illness." Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 750 n.3.
62 See Taylor, supra note 549, at 561 (stating that the Court in Young improperly
found the statute unconstitutional after analyzing the statutory language and legislative
history, misconstruingthe statutory language, placing undue weight on psychiatric language
and concluding that the mental illness requirement was not met).
629 See Fujimoto, supra note 519, at 883 (stating that "Shriner... could not be
committed under the [InvoluntaryTreatment Act] because he failed to meet two criteria for
involuntarycommitment: he was not mentally ill and had not performed an overt act during
confinement...").
630 WASH. REV. CODE §71.05.150 (1989) ("[l]f a person, as a result of mental
disorder, presents a likelihood of serious harm to others or himself... [then] such mental
health professional ... may petition for initial detention .... ).
631 See Boerner, supra note 556, at 544 (explainingthat WASH. REV. CODE'§ 71.05,
the general civil commitment statute, was not intended to subject offenders to long term
confinement and treatment and that it was proper not to confine Shriner).
632 See Fuj imoto,supra note 519, at 883 (stating that the Sexually Violent Predators
Act, WASH. REV. CODE §71.09, was created because of the Shriner case).
633 See generally Robert M. Wettstein, A Psychiatric Perspective on Washington's
Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 597, 603-04 (1992)
(discussing the fact "[tihat the statute does not define a 'personality disorder[,'" and that a
causal relationshipmust be shown between the disorder and the behavior in question, often
resulting in disagreementsamong those responsible for diagnosing these disorders and often
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recognized as satisfying the requirement of the United States Supreme
Court should be a form of mental disorder that the psychiatric profession
itself recognizes as a mental disorder or mental illness. 634 The point
made by the federal judge that the words make a great deal of difference
is spurious. In fact, the Supreme Court has used terms like "mentally
unstable," "abnormal condition of the mind," "mental aberration,"
"mental disease," et cetera, to fulfill the mental illness requirement for
civil commitment. 635  The Supreme Court has never confined itself
exclusively to such terms as "mental illness," which the federal judge in
Seattle insisted was the acid test.
636
Another issue involved is predicting future dangerousness.
637 I
will not go into it at great length because although it played an important
role in the early stages of this litigation, it seems to have receded into the
background.
There has been, in the history of mental health law, a fairly well
received notion that the prediction of dangerousness is difficult if not
leading to conflicts because the determinations are speculative).
634 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 317-19 (1993) (explaining that the DSM is
frequently relied upon by courts in determining the acceptance of psychiatric diagnosis and
although "mental abnormality" is not defined, the legislature has given it a meaning which
incorporates a number of recognized mental pathologies).
635 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (stating that the
governmentmay detain mentally unstable individualswho representa danger to the public);
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986) (defining a sexually dangerous person as one who
has "a mental disorder for more than one year and a propensity to commit sexual assaults,
in addition to [a] demonstration of that propensity through sexual assault").
636 See Young, 857 P.2d at 1001 (stating that the Supreme Court used the phrases
"mental illness" and "mental abnormality" interchangeably).
637 See Sentencing, Dispositional, & Treatment, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 329, 330 (1996) [hereinafter Sentencing] (quoting In re Linehan, 518
N.W.2d 609, 613 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1994)) (listing demographic characteristics, history,
sources of stress, involvement in therapy, etc. as criteria for predicting future
dangerousness);see also In re Hart, C9-95-2057 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1996) (determining
that Hart was a sexually dangerous person because the evidence was clear and convincing
that Hart was "likely to engage in sexual acts that create a substantial likelihood of serious
physical or emotional harm to another").
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impossible.638 There are many writers who attack any statute which
requires a prediction of dangerousness.63 9 The United States Supreme
Court has held that to rule out the ability to predict dangerousness is like
disinventing the wheel.64 In other words, dangerousness is such an
important concept in mental law and other fields of law as well, that we
have to predict it.64" ' One judge has gone so far as to say it may be
difficult, but we just absolutely have to do it.642 The Washington State
Supreme Court has validated the use of dangerousness as a concept."'
What has to be kept in mind is that the prediction of
dangerousness of certain categories of sex offenders is actually not
difficultto make.644 There are certain sex offenders who, after they have
committed a certain number of offenses, are easily predictable to re-
638 See Brooks, supra note 568, at 736 (stating that some critics of the Sexually
Violent Predators Act maintain that predictions of dangerousness cannot be made with a
reasonable degree of accuracy); see also Wettstein,supra note 633, at 605 (referring to "[a]
voluminous literature in law and mental health in the last quarter-century [that] attests to the
difficulties, if not impossibilities, of predicting future violent behavior"); see also Brooks,
supra note 568, at 740-41 (stating that there are methodological flaws in empirical studies
predicting future dangerousness that lead to questionable results).
639 See generally Julie Shapiro, Sources of Security, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
843, 844 (1992) (focusing on the problems of imprisoning people based on predictions of
future behavior when there is a disagreement about the accuracy of these predictions).
o See Brooks, supra note 568, at 739 (referring to Justice White, in Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), stating that asking the Court to ignore psychiatric predictions
of future dangerousness was "somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel").
" Id. at 737 (quotingJustice Stevens, in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), as
saying that "[ilndeed, prediction of future criminal conduct is an essential element in many
of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system").
642 Id. (quoting Justice Stevens in Jurek, as saying "the fact that such a
determination [of future dangerousness] is difficult, however, does not mean that it cannot
be made").
" Young, 857 P.2d at 1004 (stating that "there is no doubt that commitment is
predicated on dangerousness under the statute").
I See Brooks, supra note 568, at 749-50 (stating that most offenders proposed for
civil commitment will have engaged in "repeated violent sexual offenses" and are
"increasingly likely to re-offend violently").
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offend.64 In fact, one of the biggest experts in the field, Professor
Quinsey,646 has said that at least eighty percent of the predictions of
future re-offenses are accurate.647 Litigators in this field have, more or
less for the time being, abandoned their prime reliance for attacking the
statute on the basis of dangerousnessand cannot be accurately predicted.
One final point has to do with a due process question, namely,
that the nature and duration of the confinement has to fit the
requirements of due process. 4 That issue was not discussed by the
federal district court, but was discussed in the Washington State
Supreme Court.649
I will just make one final point, and that is to state one question:
what is the motivation of the opponents of this statute in fighting it as
zealously as they do? There are so few offenders involved in
Washington, and there are likely to be very few offenders involved in
645 See id. at 750 (speaking of the well accepted position that those offenders
having committed a string of violent acts were likely to re-offend violently).
646 Ball, supra note 206, at 434 n.209 (Professor Vernon Quinsey is a professor of
psychology at Queens University, Kingston, Ontario).
6" See Morse, supra note 521, at 126 n.39 (citing a study done by Vernon L.
Quinsey and David B. Villeneuve showing that 78.3% of high-risk recidivist, mentally
disordered offenders were rearrested). But see John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually
Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655, 701-02 (1992) (citing David Boerner, SENTENCING IN
WASHINGTON: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1981(1985), who
states that many studies showed that predictionsof future dangerous behavior can be wrong
eighty to ninety percent of the time).
648 Fouchav. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992) (holding that "due process requires
that the nature of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
individual is committed").
" See generally State v. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073 ("[W]hile a known sex offender
living in a community where another sex offense occurs may well be a suspect, he has all of
the due process and constitutional protections enjoyed by any other citizen and cannot be
arrested simply because of his past conviction." (citing State v. Taylor, 835 P.2d 245, 249
(Wash. 1992))).
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other states, including New Jersey.65° It has to do with the fear that if a
statute like this is declared constitutional,the doors may be opened wide
to creating new concepts of mental illness and, in effect, confining
* people simply because they are perceived as dangerous and that this new
approach would subvert the criminal justice system.65" ' I have talked to
many opponents of this statute, and I am not including Professor Janus
in this because I have not discussed this with him, who say that they do
not mind these sex offenders going to prison for life if somehow it could
be arranged that the thirty-six men who are now civilly committed,
could somehow be let out for a few days, commit sex offenses, and then
be sent to prison for life.652 They would not be unhappy with that
because it would be done through the criminal justice system.653 To do
it through the civil commitment system is to subvert the criminal law.654
I should end finally by saying that, based on what we know
about the legislators in Washington and elsewhere, if it should happen
that this statute is struck down as unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court, one can anticipate that criminal penalties will become
650 The reason why there have been so few objectionsto the community notification
law is because they "have been drowned out by Americans desperate to bar freed pedophiles
and serial rapists from their neighborhoods." Popkin, supra note 117, at 64.
65 See generally id. at 68 (noting that "[t]o opponents of [community notification],
the new 'civil commitment' laws ... allow a state to continue incarcerating sex offenders
after their sentences are complete..."). Michael McCarthy, Do They Belong Behind Bars;
Sex Offenders: Should Rapists Like Vance Cunningham Ever be Released from Prison? No,
Say Washington Authorities Who Draftedthe States 'Sexual Predator'Statute, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991, at El (stating that opponents to civil commitment claim it is "an
attempt to circumvent the constitutional rights of criminal defendants").
652 Robb London, Strategy on Sex Crimes in Prison, Then Prison, THE COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 8, 1991, at B 16 (stating that Washington's civil commitment
laws "require a convicted sex offender to serve his full penal sentence and then-and only
then-permits the state to seek lifelong extension of his incarceration ... ").
653 But see id. (stating that attorney La Fond said that "for non-violent offenses, a
legislature is unlikely to pass life prison sentences").
654 Id. Critics claim that this statute allows prosecutors to circumvent the burdens
of proof required under the General Involuntary Civil Commitment statute. Id
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harsh. The legislators in Washington have made that clear. 55 They
have said if this statute is struck down, then we have no alternative but
to impose extremely harsh life term sentences, as we have seen, in "three
strikes and you're out"'656 or "two strikes and you're out"6" and in some
cases "one strike and you're out."'658
655 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9.94A. 120(4) (West 1995) (providing that '[a]
persistent offender shall be sentenced to a term of total confinement for life without the
possibility of parole...").
656 Id.; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. §53-a-40(West 1994); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11,
§4214 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. §17-10-7 (Harrison 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-4504
(1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (West 1996).
657 ARK. CODE ANN. §5-4-501 (Michie 1995); CAL PENAL CODE §667 (West
1996).
658 CAL. PENAL CODE §§667.61, 667.71, 1203.66 (West Supp. 1995).
